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Abstract
Based on an ongoing attempt to integrate Natural Language instructions with human
figure animation, we demonstrate that agents' understanding and use of instructions can
complement what they can derive from the environment in which they act. We focus on
two attitudes that contribute to agents' behavior - their intentions and their expectations
- and shown how Natural Language instructions contribute to such attitudes in ways that
complement the environment. We also show that instructions can require more than one
context of interpretation and thus that agents' understanding of instructions can evolve as
their activity progresses. A significant consequence is that Natural Language understanding
in the context of behavior cannot simply be treated as "front end" processing, but rather
must be integrated more deeply into the processes that guide an agent's behavior and
respond to its perceptions.

1

Introduction

This is a short position paper on what we have learned about language, behavior and the
environment from an ongoing attempt t o use Natural Language instructions t o guide the taskrelated behavior of animated human figures. While the project, AnimNL (for "Animation and
Natural Language") is not yet ready to deliver a prototype, we believe that what we have so far
learned from this attempt t o produce a complete vertical integration from language t o animated
behavior will be of interest and benefit t o others as well.
AnimNL builds upon the JackTM animation system developed at the University of Pennsylvania's Computer Graphics Research Laboratory. In Jack, animation follows from model-based
* T h e authors would like t o thank Brett Achorn, Breck Baldwin, Welton Becket, Moon Jung, Michael White,
a n d Xinmin Zhao, all of whom have contributed greatly t o t h e current version of AnimNL. We would also like
t o t h a n k Phil Agre, Joseph Rosenzweig, Jeffrey Siskind, Mark Steedman, Michael White, a n d two anonymous
reviewers for their comments o n the many drafts this paper has gone through. T h e research h a s been partially
supported by ARO Grant DAAL03-89-C-0031 including participation by t h e U.S. Army Research Laboratory
(Aberdeen), Natick Laboratory, a n d t h e Institute for Simulation a n d Training; U.S. Air Force DEPTH contract
through Hughes Missile Systems F33615-91-C-0001; DMSO through the University of Iowa; National Defense
Science a n d Engineering Graduate Fellowship i n Computer Science DAAL03-92-G-0342; NSF Grant IRI91-17110,
CISE Grant CDA88-22719, a n d Instrumentationand Laboratory Improvement Program Grant USE-9152503, a n d
DARPA grant N00014-90-J-186.

simulation of virtual agents acting in an environment. The agents of primary interest are Jack's
biomechanically reasonable and anthropometrically-scaled human models (see Figure 1). The
models have 138 joints, including an accurate torso, and a growing repertoire of naturalistic
behaviors such as walking, stepping, looking, reaching, turning, grasping, strength-based lifting,
and both obstacle and self-collision avoidance 151. Each of these behaviors is environmentally
reactive. That is, incremental computation is able to adjust an agent's performance t o the situation, as the situation progresses, without further involvement of the higher level processes [lo]
unless an exceptional failure condition is signaled. Different limits can be placed on an agent's
vision, strength and comfort threshold, for more realistic environmental response, and different
environments can easily be constructed, so as to vary the situations in which the figures are
acting.'
With these features, we believe that Jack can provide a fairly realistic target for linking
Natural Language with behavior. This is because Jack agents "naturally" face limits on their
ability to understand Natural Language utterances, much as people do: their ability t o understand language relies on their knowledge, their knowledge is mediated by what they can perceive,
and their perception is limited. Moreover, since Jack agents can, like people, effect changes on
their world, their understanding of language can evolve through intentional activity in the world
(cf. Section 2).
From our work with Jack, what we have been led to believe about language, behavior and
the environment is that
Just as an agent may be motivated by its environment to consider adopting particular
goals as intentions that will guide it subsequent behavior, so an agent may also be motivated by Natural Language instructions. Moreover, goals recognized as being situationally
relevant either through perceiving the environment or processing instructions, can clarify
the meaning of other instructions. (Huffman and Laird 1321 see a similar complementarity
of roles between language and the environment in an agent's acquisition of procedural
knowledge.)
Just as an agent uses its perception of the current environment to augment its knowledge
and guide its current behavior, so too can an agent use expectations derived from instructions about how a situation will evolve, to augment its beliefs and guide its current and
future behavior.
Intentions and expectations can complement one another. Intentions can embody an agent's
expectations that the agent can act in ways to satisfy those intentions, while expectations can
lead an agent to form intentions to check that those expectations are satisfied and to take
corrective actions if not.
l I n discussing agents, we will use the pronoun 'Lhe",since we will be using a male figure in our illustrated
example - i.e., a figure with male body proportions. The J a c k animation system provides anthropometrically
sizable female figures as well.

Figure 1: An Animated Agent

Three caveats are necessary here: one involving the quality of everyday instructions, a second
involving the sources of an agent's intentions, and a third involving the existence of a distinct
"instructor".
First, the task of formulating instructions is clearly not without problems for human language
users, as the prevalence of incomprehensible and/or useless instructions shows. Two of our own
favorites are:
"Replace items on vehicle with items contained in this kit." (ANCO Replacement
Windshield-Washer Pump, Stock No. 61-14)
"To access the next highest programmed station setting, or to switch to a lower programmed station, the SCAN buttons must be repeatedly pressed." (VCR, Mitsubishi
Electronics)
There are many possible things to blame for the prevalance of poor instructions, including (1)
the prevalence of poor writing, in general; (2) a writer's inability to be too specific, because
they lack detailed knowledge of the exact situation in which the task will be carried out; and
(3) the difficulty people have in converting narrative accounts of past behavior or experience
into effective instructions for future behavior. (Recall, for example, the joke about the bus rider
who asks a fellow passenger where he should get off for City Hall. The latter replies, "Just get
off one stop before I do".)
While significant work is being done to improve the quality of instructions [3, 25, 17, 45, 461,
in the end, one may have to accept that no fixed instruction set can serve all agents in all
situations.
Secondly, real agents will always have additional intentions that come from sources other
than instructions: intentions arise from personal goals and desires, as well as from the policies
(social, governmental, etc.) an agent agrees to adhere to. However, we have simplified the
situation to one of semi-autonomous agents who have no other intentions than those that follow
from their given instructions. This does not mean, however, that nothing else influences their
behavior. Since Jack agents are environmentally reactive, features in the changing environment
affect their behavior as well. For example, an agent instructed to go to the door may also have
to take action to avoid obstacles it finds blocking its way. In future work, we plan to address
instructions that convey general policy, and to allow it to affect agent behavior as well. For
animated agent behavior that follows from particular personality traits, the reader is referred
to work by Bates et al. [9, 371 and by Morawetz [14].
Thirdly, in real life there is often no distinct instructor around. In the case of multi-person
tasks, this means the conduct of a task is often a product of negotiation by the participants,
each with their own knowledge and beliefs [29, 471. The intentions and expections of any one of
them then may then reflect what has been negotiated by the group. We argue though that the
situation with a distinct instructor can show more simply that instructions can allow an agent
t o form beliefs about the world that it can act on with relative confidence.

The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, we discuss plans and instructions
in general, as well as some related work. We also give a brief overview of AnimNL, in support
of the points we will be making about instructions, intentions and expectations. Intentions are
then discussed in Section 3, and Expectations in Section 4.

2
2.1

Background
Plans and Instructions

Early views of Natural Language instructions corresponded to the early views of plans: instructions were treated as specifying nodes of a plan that, when completely expanded into primitive
action specifications, would control agent behavior. This view, for example, underlies SHRDLU's
successful response to instructions such as "Pick up the green pyramid and put it in the box"
1541.
T h a t plans should not be viewed as control structures has already been well argued by Agre
and Chapman [I], Pollack [42], Suchman [48], and others in the field. Agre and Chapman show
that when people form plans in response to instructions, they appear to use those plans as
resources. The actual task situation may then lead them to interpolate additional actions not
mentioned in the instructions, to replace actions specified in the instructions with other ones
that seem better suited to the situation, and to ground referring terms as a consequence of their
actions rather than as a precondition for them. Other researchers, working in what has come
to be called a BDI framework ("beliefs, desires and intentions") now view planning in terms of
agents adopting (and dropping) intentions to act [13, 16, 29, 431.
A plan's relationship with a set of instructions is also not rigid. It depends, inter alia on
various features of the instructions, including:
whether the instructions convey doctrine (general policy regarding behavior in some range
of situations) or procedure (actions to be taken now or at some specified time in the future);
in the case of procedural instructions, whether they are given before, during, or after action;
whether the instructions are meant as advice, suggestion, order, request, warning, or tutorial.
These features are apparent in recent work involving instructed agents. For example, in Chapman's work [15], instructions are given as advice to agents already engaged in an activity. They
are treated as additional evidence for an action alternative already identified by the agent as being relevant to the current situation. That alternative may not, however, be taken immediately
(or ever) if other alternatives have more evidence in their favor. Chapman derives this view
from observing how arcade game players follow instructions given to them by kibbitzers watching them play. (Chapman also notes that negative instructions can be similarly understood as
evidence against actions.)

Vere and Bickmore treat most instructions to their "basic agent", Homer, as orders t o carry
out specific tasks [50]. However, they have also enabled Homer to interpret negative instructions
as policy that can override orders that conflict with it. They give an example in which Homer
( a small submarine) is told not to leave its island, and it subsequently refuses t o comply with
an instruction t o take a picture of the Codfish (a ship) because t o do so would require leaving
the island.
Work by Alterman and his students [2] shows how instructions given after an incorrect action
has been performed are treated as assistance, helping agents to accommodate their existing
routines t o the device currently at hand. In this approach, routines evolved over many different
instances of engagement help focus an agent on the details of the situation that require attention
and on the decisions that must be made. Instructions may interrupt activity t o call attention
t o other relevant details or decisions, or to correct decisions already made. Neither plans nor
instructions function as control structures that determine the agent's behavior.
Our own work has focussed on procedural instructions given to agents before undertaking a
task. Such intructioiis can be found i11 user's manuals, owner's manuals, maintenance manuals,
and "how to" books - for example,
Depress door release button to open door and expose paper bag. (Royal CAN vACTM
Owner's Manual, p. 5.)
Remove safety wire from access unit adjusting bolt and adjusting link and loosen bolt. (Air
Force Manual T.O.IF-16C-2-94JG-50-2, Ammunition Drum, Removal and Installation)
If candle wax falls on a piece of furniture, wait until it solidifies, then pick it off with your
fingernail or a plastic spatula. (McGowan & DuBern, Home Repair. London: Dorling
Kindersley Ltd. 1991, p. 22.)
One application that could benefit from the ability to understand and animate agent behavior
that would follow from such instructions is task analysis in connection with Computer-Aided
Design. By enabling virtual human agents to carry out maintenance and repair tasks in the
CAD environment itself, a designer could determine before the artifacts were built whether
people would be able to carry out those tasks in anticipated environments.
There are at least three ways to make different virtual agents interact with objects in different
virtual environments. One way is through direct manipulation, which would require a designer
t o directly control a range of different agents in a range of different environments, in order
to observe and evaluate their behavior. A second way is through direct motion sensing (e.g.
"Virtual Reality" kinesthetic input [4]). The third way is through Natural Language level
instructions. This could be the most economical, since it would allow the designer t o simply
"rerun" the same instructions with different agent-environment pairs, in order to accomplish
the same ends.
Other potential application areas for using instructions t o direct the behavior of animated

agents include group training activities and multi-agent simulations. Thus we feel that enabling
virtual human agents to understand instructions is of practical as well as theoretical interest.

2.2

Overview of the AnimNL Architecture

We begin with a brief overview of the AnimNL architecture, since it captures our beliefs that
language understanding is a process that evolves, in part, through principled interaction with
the world. Roughly speaking, AnimNL consists of three interacting modules:
A module consisting of processes that work towards understanding an instruction step in
terms of an initial structure of intentions, which we call a plan graph. These processes
include parsing, interpretation and plan inference [18, 19, 20, 211.
A module consisting of a high-level incremental planner and two specialized processes able
t o adapt highly-parameterized plans for search and for object manipulation t o the exact
situation at hand [26, 27, 28, 36, 411.
A simulator that coordinates motion directives and perceptual requests from the planning
components with ones corresponding t o environmental responses, and schedules their performance. An agenda allows multiple behaviors t o be carried out in parallel, and other
behaviors t o be initiated and terminated asyiichronously with respect t o each other [lo].
The result is that an agent's behavior at any time reflects both its low-level responses to the current environment and the current state of its high-level intentions. A more detailed description
of the AnimNL architecture can be found in [53].

3

Intentions from Instructions

Intentions have been identified as a factor in rational behavior by various researchers (e.g.,
[12, 13, 15, 42]), who see them as playing at least two roles: (1) they can constrain the courses
of action an agent need consider to those consistent with what the agent already plans t o do; and
(2) they can be used t o determine when an action can be said to be relevant, t o have succeeded
or t o have failed.
We have found that goals specified in instructions which, in the case of positive instructions,
are goals that agents are being ordered or advised or requested t o adopt as their intentions can also affect (1) how an agent interprets action descriptions in those instructions and (2) how
the agent behaves in carrying out actions. In the first case, instructions perform a role that
Chapman's PhD thesis [15] shows can also be performed by the environment. In Chapman's
work, apparently underspecified instructions are interpreted simply as evidence for a response
t o the current environment that has already been deemed relevant on the basis of perception.
Therefore, if a knife can be used either to kill a monster or t o jimmy a door, and if a monster
-

is threatening the agent and no door needs t o be jimmied (e.g., to enable the agent t o escape),
an instruction such as "use the knife" will be understood only as advice t o kill the monster.
In Section 3.1, we show how goals specified in Natural Language instructions can function
in a similar way, and in Section 3.2, we comment on how intentions derived from instructions
can affect low-level behavioral features. We conclude in Section 3.3 with a brief discussion on
how the action representation used in AnimNL allows its high-level planner t o use intentions
effectively.

3.1

Behavioral Import of Purpose Clauses

Comments are often made about the eficiency of Natural Language - how much of an utterance's meaning can be left unspecified, t o be filled in by listeners able t o draw on an appropriate
context. In this light, we have come t o understand that purpose clauses - infinitival clauses
that convey the goal of an action - provide a helpful source of information for understanding
underspecified action descriptions which convey information implicitly through context. While
this information could of course be made explicit, people seem not t o expect this: speakers
commonly leave it for hearers t o figure out for themselves.'
Consider the following example (from [la]):
Place a plank between two ladders to make a simple scaffold.
The action description in the main clause is "place a plank between two ladders". The goal
conveyed in the purpose clause is "make a simple scaffold". Now, by itself, the main clause
conveys no explicit constraints on the orientation of what have t o be two step-ladders and only
one constraint on the placement of the plank that it be somewhere in the 3-dimensional space
"between" wherever the step-ladders are. However there are significant implicit constraints that
follow from the purpose of making a simple scaffold: the ladders should be aligned with their
treads facing outwards in opposite directions, at a distance spannable by the plank, which should
be placed horizontally on treads of the two ladders that are the same height off the ground. (How
high off the ground will depend on the purpose of the scaffold: it is not determinable from the
given instruction alone.) An (incremental) plan can then be formulated t o comply with both
the explicit and implicit contraints on the procedure and its intended result.
Our second example is intended to show that an agent can use a goal expression and perceptual tests on when that goal is achieved to determine the referent of a noun phrase and hence
what action he or she is meant t o carry out. The instruction t o be considered is:
-

Vacuum the rug or carpet against the direction of the pile to leave it raised.
'There are, of course, other linguistic means of conveying purpose - free adjuncts [52], means clauses [7, 81,
and even simple conjunction [24]. Moreover, clauses that convey purpose do serve other functions as well, such
as making an action description easier to understand [22, 231 or justifying why an action should be done [8].Our
point here is simply that any linguistic specification of goals (purpose clauses being a clear example) can serve,
like the environment, as the context in which an underspecified action description can be elaborated and thereby
correctly understood.

To follow this instruction, an agent must know the direction referred t o as "against the direction
of the pile". If the agent does not know the referent of this phrase before starting, the purpose
clause ("to leave it raised") can be used to guide his or her search for it. That is, the agent can
plan t o vacuum a bit in various directions and observe which the direction of sweep leaves the
pile raised. At this point, the agent can begin t o elaborate a plan for vacuuming the entire rug
or carpet in that direction and thereby finish the job.
A further example is related to a matter we return t o in Section 4, and concerns the termination conditions associated with perceptual tests. (The instructions are for removing wine
stains from a rug or carpet.)
Blot with clean tissues t o remove any liquid still standing. Sprinkle liberally with
salt t o extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric. Vacuum up the salt.
In the first sentence, blotting with clean tissues specifies a type of activity but not the extent
t o which it should be pursued. (In the terminology of Moens and Steedman [40], it is simply
a process like "running", not a culminated process like "running a mile" : it has no intrinsic
endpoint.) How long an agent should blot the stained area comes from the purpose clause "to
remove any liquid still standing": the agent should plan t o interleave blotting with perception,
until no standing liquid is left visible.
The purpose clause in the second sentence conveys in a somewhat different way the condition
under which the agent can start the final step, vacuuming up the salt. It is not the termination
point of the sprinkling (which is terminated when the agent decides there is now a "liberal"
amount of salt on the stain [34]), but that of the subsequent waiting. How long the agent should
wait comes from the purpose clause "to extract liquid that has soaked into the fabric". The
agent must plan t o interleave waiting with perception, continuing until he perceives that the
salt is damp (i.e., a change in visual texture). At this point, the salt has extracted as much
liquid as it can, and the agent can commence vacuuming.
This example illustrates the complementary relation between intention and expectation: the
intention t o remove the standing liquid leads t o an expectation that blotting it will eventually
accomplish this removal, which in turn leads to an intention to observe the situation, monitoring
for the expected point at which no liquid will be left standing.
To say the above is not to say that an agent's only intentions are those derived from instructions, but rather that goals specified in instructions, which the agent may adopt as intentions,
can provide a context for fully understanding underspecified action description in instructions.
Di Eugenio has designed and implemented the machinery t o be used in AnimNL for computing many of the inferences that follow from understanding that the action a described in
the main clause of an utterance is being done for the purpose .rr described in a purpose clause.
This relationship between a and .rr can be characterized more specifically as either generation or
enablement. In generation, executing a under appropriate circumstances is all that is required
t o achieve K . In enablement, a brings about circumstances in which .rr can be generated by
subsequent actions.

Di Eugenia's approach makes use of both linguistic knowledge and planning knowledge. A
knowledge base of plan schemata (or recipes) complements a taxonomic structure of action
descriptions. The latter is represented in Classic [ll] and exploits classification t o allow an
inference algorithm t o find related action descriptions. These descriptions index into the knowledge base of recipes which includes information about generation, enablement and sub-structure
relationships between actions. The inference algorithms on these linked structures are described
in detail in [18, 191.
An instruction may convey t o the agent that a generation or enablement relationship holds
between two actions, without the agent being able t o determine which one, from the text alone.
This may lead t o confusion when the agent comes t o act on the instruction. For example, recall
the R o y a l CAN VAC instruction given in Section 2.1:
Depress door release button t o open door and expose paper bag.
(This is from a procedure for replacing the dust bag when it is full.) Whether a generation
or enablement relation holds between "depressing the button" and "opening the door" will
depend simply on the orientation of the canister. If the canister is horizontal when the button
is depressed and the catch released, the door will fall open of its own accord because of gravity.
In this case, depressing the button will generate opening the door, without the need for further
action. If however, the agent has up-ended the canister t o make the button more accessible,
depressing the button will just release the catch: the agent must still grasp the door and pull it
open. An agent who expected the former may think he didn't press the button hard enough and
try again, rather than think an additional action was called for. Although this is a relatively
trivial example, readers will probably recognize the problem. It could be solved by making the
instruction more specific:
Holding canister horizontally, depress door release button t o open door and expose
paper bag.
However, making the text longer seems t o decrease the likelihood that it will be read. Trying
t o convey the information graphically [25] relies on the reader distinguishing between necessary
features of the depicted scene and accidental ones. This suggests that producing instructions of
guaranteed reliability may be an impossible task.

3.2

Intentions and Behavioral Features

In the previous section, we distinguished two relations, generation and enablernent, holding
between an action and its current purpose. Viewing purpose in terms of an agent's intention t o
achieve i t , we now discuss the need we have discovered, to take account of that intention when
computing low-level features of the action to be performed and animated. Such features may
include the place at which the agent locates itself to perform the action, and the manner in
which it grasps an object involved in the action or moves it. While our current implementation

of this capability is simply via table look-up, a more general and extensible solution is being
pursued [36] for a wide class of object manipulation tasks. In the meanwhile, we believe it is
still worthwhile t o illustrate the phenomenon, if only by example, since such a difference can be
made to human figure animation by a figure's carrying out a task-related action "naturally",
even when particular behavioral choices are not necessary t o simply the success of the specified
action.
Our first example involves the region in which an object will be grasped. If a hammer is
t o be grasped simply t o enable it to be moved from place to place, any region of the hammer
is a viable grasp location, although somewhere near its center of mass may make it easier for
the agent t o lift and transport. If however, the hammer is to be grasped t o enable its use in
hammering a nail, a more appropriate grasp region would be towards the end of its shank. Even
then, re-orientation may be required, once the hammer is lifted.
Our second example involves constraints on an agent's target in moving to a location. Consider the simple instruction
Go over t o the mirror.
By itself, this tells an agent little about where he or she is supposed t o end up being positioned
with respect to the mirror. On the other hand, specifying a goal that will be enabled by reaching
a target location can help an agent to better identify that location. For example,
Go over t o the mirror and straighten it.
Go over t o the mirror and straighten your bow tie.3
Straightening a mirror requires manipulating it, so an agent will target a comfortable arm's
reach. Straightening one's bow tie requires seeing oneself clearly: this may target a location
either closer t o or further away from the mirror, depending on the agent's eyesight. Note that
the instructor may not know enough about the agent to specify a target location in more detail:
it is something that only the agent can determine. Thus no further explicit guidance can be
provided.
The capabilities of our existing implementation are demonstrated in an animated simulation
of "SodaJack", a soda fountain agent who can respond t o requests for a soda or ice cream [28].
In this domain, the intention t o perform a basic task action such as moving a glass so as t o
g e n e r a t e serving it t o a "customer", posts a constraint on the agent's movements that the glass
not be tipped t o one side. On the other hand, moving a glass so as to enable wiping it off posts
no such constraint. While a few simple things such as these can be done by table look-up, the
problem of systematically characterizing those features of intended actions that affect low-level
physical activity is of considerable difficulty. While the significance of this boundary between
symbol and action has been recognized and formalized in [33], much more work is needed in
order to actually cross it.
3These are examples of purposive "and", mentioned earlier in footnote 2 and discussed in more detail in [24].
The "and" form sounds more natural here than the "to" form.
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3.3

Intentions in Means/End Reasoning

Given that instructions only convey certain features of an agent's behavior, situated decision
making is necessary t o expand and amplify the agent's intentions, t o fill in gaps. To enable
decision making t o use an agent's intentions effectively, we have found it worth replacing fixed
set of preconditions, with reasoning about the effects of actions in the context in which they will
be performed.
This reflects our analysis of preconditions [27] as encoding claims about the universal desirability or undesirability of certain effects of an action. For example, failing t o clear off a block
before picking it up, may mean that objects on top of it will slide off and break or disturb other
objects. Sometimes an agent will be concerned about this possibility; other times, not. (We
assume that agents may desire to avoid particular actions or actions that may lead t o particular
states.) The problem with fixed preconditions is that they prevent an agent from considering
an action, even if the agent doesn't care about its possibly destructive side-effects.
Limited simulation, on the other hand, can enable an agent to reason roughly about the
effects of performing an action in a given world state. The agent can then decide whether or not
performing the action will satisfy his intentions without violating any behavioral constraints. In
some cases, the consequences will be acceptable given the agent's current intentions, in other
cases, they won't. This use of situated reasoning through limited simulation allows the system
to use intentions t o define, in a situation-specific way, when an action is applicable and can
be successful rather than using an a p r i o r i definition. (Another use of limited simulation in
planning are discussed in [38].)
The removal of preconditions from action operators has multiple effects. One benefit is t o
give the system more flexibility in choosing which actions to use to achieve its ends. However,
the cost of this increased flexibility is that actions may fail to achieve these ends. In short, using
intentions and limited simulation t o perform action selection means the possibility of action
failure must be allowed for.
The current version of AnimNL's planner, which eliminates preconditions in favor of situated
reasoning about the effects of actions, is described in more detail in [26, 271.

4

Expectations from Instructions

Here we address the role of instructions in raising e x p e c t a t i o n s that complement an agent's current perceptions in influencing its behavior. Expectations can lead t o further perceptual activity
- not just observation but also activities that enable observation. As such, expectations from
instructions complement the signals coming in from the outside world. Here we discuss three
types of expectations generated by different elements in instruction, and the "active perception"
[6] they can engender.

4.1

Expectations about Processes

In some earlier work designed for creating animations from recipes, Karlin [34] analysed a
range of temporal and frequency adverbs found in instructions. One particular construction she
analysed is the following:
Do a for <duration> or until <event>
e.g. Steam two minutes or until mussels open.
Karlin notes that this is not a case of logical disjunction, where the agent can choose which
disjunct to follow: rather, the explicit duration suggests the usual amount of time that it will
take t o just cook the mussels. This can be detected when all the mussels that were closed when
they were put into the pot (already open ones having been discarded as dead) are now open. If
they are not open after two minutes, the agent should wait a bit longer. Those that have not
opened after another short wait should then be discarded, since they are full of mud.
The usefulness of an expectation such as this comes from the cost of sensing. Steaming is
usually done in a closed, opaque cooking pot, so the lid must be removed in order t o check
the state of the contents. Whenever this is done, steam escapes, setting the process back. The
result of sensing too often then is that the mussels become tough through over-cooking. The
expectation can therefore be used t o gauge how long t o wait before beginning to make costly
sensing tests.

4.2

Expectations about Consequences

Processes often have more than one possible outcome, depending on how long they proceed
and how much resources they consume. Another type of expectation arising from instructions
concerns the properties of objects that will result from such processes. (This is described in
more detail in [51].)
Consider for example, mixing flour, butter and water.4 Depending on the relative amounts
of these three ingredients and the absorbency of the flour (different for different types of flour
and for winter and summer wheat), the result may be anything from a flakey mass to a viscous
batter. Instructions can indicate the intended result, so that the agent can modify and/or
augment his actions so as t o produce it. How instructions convey the intended result can vary:
In Example la-c, the expected viscosity of the resulting mixture is conveyed through the verb:
l a . Mix the flour, butter and water, and knead until smooth and shiny.
b. Mix the flour, butter and water, and spread over the blueberries.
c. Mix the flour, butter and water, and stir until all lumps are gone.
while in Example 2a-b, it is conveyed through the noun phrase:
4This is not something we are capable of animating without simulating the properties of semi-viscous fluids,
but it is the best example for making our point.

2a. Mix the flour, butter and water. Let the dough relax for 15 minutes.
b. Mix the flour, butter and water. Let the batter sit for 15 minutes.
There are several ways in which expectations such as these can affect an agent's behavior. The
simplest is t o monitor the result: if it doesn't meet the agent's expectation (too liquid or too
solid), the agent can compensate with additional amounts of flour in the former case or water
in the latter. Alternatively, the agent can monitor the process: that is, he can add the specified
amount of water t o the specified amounts of butter and flour gradually, mixing it in. If it is
becoming too viscous, he can stop before adding all the ingredients.

4.3

Expectations about Locations

Actions can effect changes in the world that alter what an agent can perceive. Part of an
agent's cognitive task in understanding instructions is therefore to determine for each referring
expression, the perceptual context in which the agent is meant to find (or ground) its referent.
Some referring expressions in an instruction may be intended t o refer t o objects in the currently
perceivable situation, while others may be intended t o refer to objects that only appear (i.e.,
come into existence or become perceivable) as a consequence of carrying out an action specified
in the instruction.
The difference can be seen by comparing the following two instructions
3a. Go into Fred's office and get me the red file folder.
b. Go into Fred's office and refile the red file folder.
At issue is the referent of the expression "the red file folder". In (3a), it is clearly the red file
folder that the listener will find in Fred's office, a file folder whose existence the listener may
previously have not been aware of. That is, (3a) leads a listener t o develop the expectation that
after they perform the initial action and go into Fred's office, they will be in a context in which
it makes sense t o determine the referent of "the red file folder". In contrast, given instruction
(3b), it is reasonable for a listener to first try t o ground "the red file folder" in the context
in which the instruction is given. If successful, the listener can then go into Fred's office and
refile it. If unsuccessful though, a listener will not just take the instruction t o be infelicitous (as
they would in the case of an instruction like "Pick up the file folder", if there were currently
no file folder around).. Rather they will adopt the same locational expectation as in the first
example, that the red file folder is in Fred's office. What is especially interesting is the strength
of this expectation: a cooperative agent will look around, if an object isn't where they expect
it t o be until they find it. This has led Moore to develop flexible procedures he calls search
plans [41] following [39], that can be used t o guide an agent in grounding both definite and
indefinite referring expressions. Moore's search plans are able to incorporate expectations about
the context in which a referring expression will receive its intended grounding, t o limit search.
In AnimNL, Di Eugenio has attempted to derive some of these expectations through plan
inference techniques described in more detail in [19, 201. In this case, the inferences are of the

form: if one goes t o place p for the purpose of doing action a , then expect to do a at p. If a
has among its applicabiIity conditions - conditions that must hold for a t o make sense, in terms
of its potential for success in the circumstances [35, 44, 491 - that one or more of its argument
be at its performance site p , then a locational expectation develops as in (3a). If not, a weaker
expectation arises, as in (3b). (Notice that this can even arise on the basis of a single clause:
"Bring me the red file folder from downstairs" leads to a similar expectation as (3a), while
"Give the man downstairs the red file folder" leads t o a similar expectation as (3b). Haas [31],
citing examples such as "Pick up the book behind you", points out a problem with indexical
descriptions such as "the book behind you". A listener must decide whether such descriptions
are to be grounded before they act - in this case, so that it makes sense t o turn around to see
the book in order to pick it up - or whether they must act on the description as given.)
In addition t o expectations concerning the location of an object satisfying a particular description, an agent may also develop expectations concerning the particular description that
needs t o be satisfied. Here, an instruction like "Open the paint can" is more illustrative than
"Get the book". An agent who simply seeks t o ground the expression "the paint can" in its
current situation may identify several objects of type "paint can". On the other hand, an agent
who expects t o be able t o open the referent of "the paint can" will seek t o ground a more specific
expression such as "the closed paint can" or "the paint can that needs opening" .5

5

Conclusion

The central theme of this special issue is "principled characterizations of agent-environment
interactions". What we have tried t o characterize in this short position paper are ways in which
agents' understanding and use of instructions can complement what they can derive from the
environment in which they act, lessons we have learned from attempting a complete vertical
integration from Natural Language instructions t o animated human figures. We have focussed
on two attitudes that contribute to agents' behavior - their intentions and their expectations and shown how Natural Language in the form of instructions provides a source of such attitudes
in ways that complement the environment. We have also made the point that instructions can
require more than one context of interpretation. Thus agents' understanding of instructions will
evolve as their activity progresses. Understanding instructioiis is thus not a one-shot process
that occurs entirely prior to activity. Language understanding is not just something that takes
place "at the front end"
5This is similar, in some ways, to Haddock's "the rabbit in the hat" example [30]in which the phrase as a
whole may refer uniquely in a context, even though neither of its component noun phrases ("the rabbit" and
"the hat") do. Haddock's solution makes use of constraint satisfaction, the "in" relation constraining possible
rabbit referents to ones that are in hats and possible hat referents to ones that contain rabbits.
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